Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Self-ascription, philosophy: self-attribution is the identification of properties by a subject that refers to itself through this act. The important fact is that this type of statements can claim a higher degree of certainty than external attribution b y a different person. See also certainty, attribution, ascription, truth conditions, privileged access, introspection, I, self, person.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Peter Geach on Self- Ascription - Dictionary of Arguments

I 128
Belief about oneself/Geach: must be analyzed as a complex predicate. E.g. "Phillip thinks of Philip to be worst enemy of Philip.."
is only unambiguous if "he himself" is inserted.
>He/He himself
, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Attribution, >Predication, >Self-reference, >Quasi-indicator.
Geach: truth here is not depending on empiricism but on meanings. -
"He himself" cannot be expressed in schemes such as "p>q".
"Taking himself for being dead": is formally not true, because of the meanings of the subexpressions.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28
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